The United States: from guarantor to source of global risk

The United States is positioned as the main source of geopolitical risk in 2026. The Trump administration implements a policy characterized by the replacement of experts with people loyal to the president. The politicization of economic decisions generates an inefficient allocation of capital, prioritizing political alignment over productivity. This democratic rollback will empower autocratic regimes in other regions.

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The Donroe Doctrine: Redefining Latin America

The Trump administration will double down on efforts to push aligned candidates in the upcoming elections in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru. This strategy presents significant risks: it may sow anti-Americanism and displace conflicts, traffickers and cartels into new territories, potentially generating the opposite of the intended effect and weakening U.S. influence in the long run.

Europe without direction: three powers at a standstill

France, Germany and the United Kingdom simultaneously face weak governments incapable of governing effectively. Europe’s political center has been crumbling for a decade, evidenced by Brexit, the implosion of traditional French parties and the rise of Germany’s far right (AfD). Decisive action to boost competitiveness and investment is impossible when governments are struggling to survive. The Trump administration, moreover, openly supports the European populist right and promotes a more fragmented Europe, aggravating the continental governance crisis.

Russia intensifies hybrid warfare

Russia will escalate gray zone operations against NATO. Putin envisions hybrid warfare as the optimal strategy to wear down Europe without crossing the threshold that would trigger NATO’s Article 5. Trump’s skepticism toward the Atlantic Alliance will produce internal tensions and more direct and dangerous confrontations between Russia and NATO.

American-style state capitalism

What Eurasia Group calls “crony capitalism” is emerging: the most economically interventionist administration since the New Deal. Companies aligned with Trump’s agenda receive better treatment from the federal government, while success in mergers, regulatory approvals and tariff exemptions requires proximity to the presidential inner circle. Tariffs, equity stakes, revenue sharing agreements and export controls. The United States adopts strategies from the Chinese playbook, although its political system cannot match Beijing’s strategic patience and consistency.

China trapped in deflation

Xi Jinping will prioritize political control and technological supremacy over consumption stimulus and structural reforms. State investment has created productive overcapacity with insufficient domestic demand to absorb it, with more than a quarter of listed Chinese companies in a loss-making situation. China will continue to export its way out of the real estate crisis through a massive wave of cheap goods in foreign markets, deepening the structural imbalances of the world’s second largest economy.

USMCA: neither dead nor alive

Trump will avoid the constraints of a new trilateral agreement to maintain bilateral leverage over Canada and Mexico. The result will be a “zombie USMCA” that is neither completely dead nor alive. Tariff exemptions for USMCA-compliant goods will remain, but in key industrial sectors (automotive, steel, aluminum) North American free trade will be over. Sectoral tariffs will create interest groups that will benefit and lobby for their maintenance, complicating trade in North America.

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Risks overestimated

Trump’s tariff strategy will become more predictable, as the most aggressive period is over and U.S. domestic politics will limit the use of tariffs as the mid-term elections approach. Despite concerns about erosion of the rule of law, the United States remains the most attractive economy for investment: no rival can match its economic dynamism.